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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
WFMST I=_s, JR.*
The decisions in this section reflect the increased attention
afforded procedural safeguards. The stimulation for this interest
is partly due to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
broadening the protection of procedural rights under the four-
teenth amendment. In part it is attributable to the growing reali-
zation that the brute force of the police combined with the severe
sanctions of the criminal law can produce irrevocable harm to
the citizenry if used improperly.
The recent decisions failed to raise important substantive
issues. State v. Fleming' involved a conspiracy prosecution for
a scheme to defraud an insurance company by speculating in life
insurance. The beneficiaries did not have an insurable interest
and the persons insured were unaware of the policies. The de-
fendant acted as intermediary. The South Carolina Supreme
Court had no difficulty in rejecting the contention that the evi-
dence was insufficient to establish defendant's guilt. An interest-
ing point, not fully explored by the opinion, is that the conspira-
tional objective was seemingly not a crime. The South Carolina
law on this issue clearly embraces the view that for conspiracy
the acts contemplated need not constitute a criminal offense.2
However, this doctrine has recently been seriously questioned.3
It places within the ambit of criminality virtually all combina-
tions to commit civil wrongs, regardless of how petty. This vague
standard for conspiracy conflicts with the requirement that crim-
inal behavior must be defined with some certainty. The legisla-
ture should reconsider this potentially dangerous threat to
freedom.
Search and Seizures
In State v. Morris4 one of the defendants claimed that evidence
was obtained by illegal search and seizure in two instances. Prior
to his arrest for murder a policeman inquired as to the where-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 243 S.C. 265, 133 S.E.2d 800 (1963).
2. This recognition is expressed in statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-550 (1962),
and court decision, State v. Davis, 88 S.C. 229, 70 S.E. 811 (1911).
3. "But it is true that most provisions fail to provide a sufficiently definite
standard of conduct to have any place in a penal code." MODz. PENAL CODE
§ 10.3 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
4. 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E.2d 744 (1963).
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abouts of his pistol and the defendant voluntarily surrendered
the weapon. The court noted that such a request, leading to a
voluntarily relinquishing of evidence by a suspect, is not an il-
legal search. After the defendant's arrest, police officers went
to his home and requested his wife to turn over an insurance
policy which the defendant had previously taken out on the
victim's life. Without objection the wife surrendered the policy
to the officers.
A wife may not consent to a search of the husband's property
during his absence. The consent must be made by the man or
head of the premises sought to be searched. 5 The court circum-
vented this difficulty by finding that the evidence was not ob-
tained by a search and seizure. "A search ordinarily implies a
quest by an officer of the law and a seizure contemplates a force-
ful dispossession of the owner." 6
Assistance of CounseZ
At what stage of the proceedings the accused is entitled to the
assistance of counsel continues to confront the court. In Moorer
v. State7 and State v. WhiteS the defendant contended that due
process required that counsel be furnished for the preliminary
hearing, relying upon the principle that the accused is entitled
to counsel at the first critical stage of the proceedings. 9 In White
the court stated:
In South Carolina, the Preliminary Hearing serves the
purpose of determining whether the State can show probable
cause and such hearing can only be requested by one charged
with crime, and he is not permitted to plead or even make a
sworn statement. If he chooses to make an unsworn state-
ment, he may do so; but it can in nowise be used against him
thereafter. The burden being upon the State to show prob-
able cause, the defendant is not permitted to offer any evi-
dence but may cross-examine the State's witnesses fully and
such evidence is not admissible in any subsequent pro-
ceedings.10
5. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND Im uNrTES, 430-34 (1961).
6. 243 S.C. 225, 235, 133 S.E.2d 744, 748-49 (1963).
7. 244 S.C. 102, 138 S.E.2d 713 (1964).
8. 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
9. The Supreme Court considers arraignment a critical stage since the de-
fendant must be plead. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) ; Hamilton
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
10. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963).
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Further, it "may be waived by failure to request same in writing
10 days before court."" From this the court held that the pre-
liminary hearing is not a critical stage.
The court's position is questionable. Since the preliminary
hearing may be waived, a decision must be made whether the
hearing would be advantageous to the accused. This is the type of
decision that requires the training of the defense counsel. Fur-
ther, the cross-examination of the state's witnesses at the hearing
again requires the lawyer's skill to be fully advantageous to the
accused.
A less important point raised in Aoorer was that the defendant
did not have counsel present during the arraignment. The ac-
cused was arraigned again in the presence of his counsel two days
after the first arraignment. The court held that the second ar-
raignment cured any defects in the first.12
Continuance
In State v. Kirby' a motion for continuance was made alleg-
ing the key witness for the defense was in the military service,
thus temporarily unavailable. An affidavit was presented by the
defense counsel stating what the witness would testify to if pres-
ent. The lower court overruled the motion but allowed the affi-
davit to be read to the jury. The court affirmed restating the
time-worn principle that a decision by the lower court regarding
continuance will not be disturbed without a clear showing of
abuse of discretion.
In State v. Young 14 the lower court granted several continu-
ances relying upon the defense counsel's contention that the
defendant was physically unable to stand trial. It then made an
examination of the defendant's condition during which several
doctors testified that the accused was able to stand trial without
danger. The denial, based upon the doctor's testimony, of a mo-
tion for another continuance was affirmed. Again the court
declared that clear abuse of discretion must be shown, but this
was buttressed by several earlier cases upholding the refusal to
continue a case because of the defendant's physical condition.
11. Ibid.
12. Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 138 S.E.2d 713 (1964).
13. 244 S.C. 67, 135 S.E.2d 361 (1964).
14. 243 S.C. 187, 133 S.E.2d 210 (1963).
1965]
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In a third case, State v. Black,15 a continuance was requested
because the most experienced defense counsel was not physically
able to fully participate in the trial. The fact his participation
was limited due to illness was undenied. The court again noted
that abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the accused must be
shown. However, the court reversed the refusal of the motion
and granted a new trial. Undoubtedly, this result accords with
enlightened law. Unfortunately, the court unduly limited its
decision with the ambiguous statement: "While it is extremely
doubtful that the refusal of the motion for a continuance con-
stituted an abuse of discretion in this case, we have concluded,
in favorem, vitae, that the circumstances warrant a new trial"' 6
[Emphasis added.] This suggests either that the refusal of a con-
tinuance when the defense counsel is ill does constitute an abuse
of discretion, or that the court will on occasion ignore the rule
it has consistently stated to be the law.
Indictment-Venue
An indictment for murder must allege the place of the com-
mission of the crime.' 7 The purpose of this requirement is to
etstablish jurisdiction of the court and to inform the accused of
the county in which he is charged.' 8 In a 1929 case, State -).
Platt,1 the indictment alleged that the deceased was assaulted
and died in Marion County when the uncontradicted proof indi-
cated he was assaulted in Marion County but died in Florence
County. Even though the assault constituted sufficient contact
for jurisdiction and venue,2 0 the court held the indictment was at
fatal variance with the proof. In a later case the court, over a
strong dissent, impliedly rejected this principle without discuss-
ing the Platt case.2 ' In State v. BostiCkl22 the issue was again
before the court affording an excellent opportunity for clarifica-
tion. Unfortunately the Bostie case merely adds to the con-
fusion. Again the court ignored the Platt case, placing emphasis
on the statute establishing jurisdiction in the county where the
assault occurred. This suggests that unnecessary allegations as
15. 243 S.C. 42, 132 S.E.2d 5 (1963).
16. Id. at 45, 132 S.E.2d at 6.
17. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 17-403 (1962).
18. State v. McIntire, 221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410 (1952).
19. 154 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 206 (1929).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-454, -456 (1962).
21. State v. Gantt, 223 S.C. 431, 76 S.E.2d 674 (1953).
22. 243 S.C. 14, 131 S.E.2d 841 (1963).
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to place of death will be treated as irrelevant surplus. IHowever,
the court then viewed the evidence as establishing beyond con-
flict that the assault and death took place as the indictment al-
leged. Whether the prosecution was required to prove the allega-
tions is left unanswered. The only obviously safe course open to
the solicitor is to allege simply the place of the assault if there
is some question about the place of death.
Selection of the Jury
Two cases, Afoorer v. State23 and State v. Fleming,2 4 raised the
issue whether Negroes had been systematically excluded from the
jury in violation of the fourteenth amendment. In South Caro-
lina eligibility for jury service is limited to qualified male elec-
tors.2 5 Fleming illustrates the difficulty. Approximately sixty
percent of Clarendon County consists of Negroes, yet of 1200
qualified male electors only about thirty-five are Negroes. 28 In
both cases evidence established that usually a few Negroes were
selected for jury duty. The court held in both instances that the
defendants failed to prove systematic exclusion.
Systematic exclusion on account of color can be established
from evidence of factual exclusion.2 7 However, where Negro
voter registration is disproportionately lower than white regis-
tration, factual exclusion becomes legally justified. Increased
Negro registration should provide interesting developments in
the extent of jury participation by Negroes.
Grand Jury-Jury List
In 1962 State v. Jackson 2 held that a grand jury was illegally
constituted when it failed to include not less than two from every
three qualified electors. Lollis v. Manning29 raised the issue
whether defendants previously convicted by a jury drawn from
23. 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713 (1964).
24. 243 S.C. 265, 133 S.E.2d 800 (1963).
25. A jury list limited by state statute to taxpayers was upheld although a
higher proportion of white than Negro citizens appeared on the list. Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
26. See 243 S.C. 265, 270, 133 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1963). In Moorer, supra
note 23, of approximately 3,000 electors, only 250 to 300 were Negro citizens.
27. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
28. 240 S.C. 238, 125 S.E.2d 474 (1962). See generally Rogers, Criminal
Law and Procedure, 1962-1963 Survey of S.C. Law, 16 S.C.L. R~v. 67, 70
(1964).
29. 242 S.C. 316, 130 S.E.2d 847 (1963).
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an illegally constituted grand jury would be entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus. The court denied relief finding a sufficient
distinction between timely objection and no objection until after
the verdict. The Code provides that no irregularity in the select-
ing of jurors is sufficient to set aside a conviction unless the
defendant was injured by the irregularity or unless objection is
made before verdict.30 The defendants were obviously not preju-
diced by the defect; thus if the illegality was a mere irregularity,
the failure to timely object amounted to a waiver under the
Code. The defendants contended that the illegal grand jury was
a jurisdictional defect, thus voiding the proceedings. In rejecting
this claim, the court noted that a defect "which does not prevent
the presence of twelve competent jurors, by whose votes the
indictment is found, and which could have been cured if the
attention of the court had been called to it at the time, or prompt-
ly remedied by the empaneling of a competent grand jury" is
only an irregularity.3 '
Instructions
In State v. White3  the defendant did not testify in his own
behalf and the trial judge upon request refused to charge the
jury that the failure of an accused to testify could not be con-
sidered against him. The judge reasoned that to call attention to
the defendant's failure to testify may be more prejudicial than
not. This was an issue of first impression, although dictum in a
previous case suggested that the instruction should be given if
requested.33
It is clear the instruction need not be given unless requested. 4
Indeed, the trial judge's belief that the instruction could be preju-
dicial is correct. However, the court correctly held that the de-
cision, whether under the circumstances of a particular situation
the instruction is helpful to the defendant, is best left to the
defense counsel.
Habeas Corpus
In Hayes v. State 5 the defendant appealed the denial of a
writ of habeas corpus sought on the grounds that the solicitor
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-214 (1962).
31. Lollis v. Manning, 242 S.C. 316, 320, 130 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1963).
32. 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E.2d 320 (1963).
33. State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 409 (1930).
34. Ibid.
35. 242 S.C. 328, 130 S.E.2d 906 (1963).
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knowingly used and encouraged false testimony. It was claimed
that the testimony of three eye witnesses was so clearly "untrue
and obviously prejudicially influenced" that the solicitor must
have known of its falsity. The court correctly affirmed the denial
pointing out that the allegations were conclusional and amounted
to no more than an attack on the credibility of the witnesses.8 6
Although the use of knowingly perjured testimony by the prose-
cuting authorities is a denial of due process,3 7 the petition must
allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case.
A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in Wyatt v.
State" alleging a number of conclusions with little factual sup-
port. The major contention was that the defendant did not con-
sent to a guilty plea with a recommendation of mercy for the
murder of his wife. The court affirmed the lower court's denial,
primarily because the trial court closely questioned the defendant
about his understanding of the guilty plea. The court also
strengthened Crosby v. State3 by implying lack of effective
assistance of counsel is a denial of due process, but the defendant
must show "counsel's purported representation was such as to
make the trial a farce and a mocking of justice." 40
In Hayes and Wyatt the court reaffirmed the principle that
the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence supporting guilt
cannot be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. The sole issue is
whether the judgment, under which the petitioner is confined,
is void.
Miscellaneous
In several cases4' the court refused to review allegedly exces-
sive sentences. This view can be justified where pre-sentence in-
vestigation places the trial judge in a superior position for
evaluation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in a prior case that
excessive sentences could violate the constitutional provision
against cruel and unusual punishment.42 It ruled unconstitutional
a thirty-year sentence for burglary where the jury recommended
36. Id. at 330, 130 S.E.2d at 907.
37. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
38. 243 S.C. 197, 133 S.E.2d 120 (1963).
39. 241 S.C. 40, 126 S.E.2d 843 (1963).
40. 243 S.C. 197, 200, 133 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1963).
41. State v. Kirby, 244 S.C. 67, 135 S.E.2d 361 (1964). State v. Bass, 242
S.C. 193, 130 S.E.2d 481 (1963).
42. State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 SE.2d 273 (1948).
19651
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mercy, the defendant had no prior record, and the thirty-year
sentence amounted to a life term to the defendant in question.
43
While following a justified limitation on sentencing, the court
consistently refuses to substitute appellate for trial court judg-
ment on the issue of punishment.
In State v. Hyde"4 the court correctly reaffirmed the view that
a person need not own the premises to be guilty of storing
whiskey thereon. The court also noted in Hyde that the failure
of the defense counsel to object to the instructions waived any
defects.
The waiver of objections due to actions of the defense counsel
was an issue in several other cases. In State v. MeCravy45 the
court held that where the defendant agreed to be tried upon two
separate indictments at the same time he cannot complain of any
prejudice resulting to him. In State v. Ohasteen46 the court re-
jected the defendant's claim of prejudicial testimony because the
testimony was brought out by his defense counsel. Similarly in
State v. 1'oung 47 the failure to object to testimony waived any
error in its admission. Also in Young the court noted that failure
to object to the indictment waived any nonjurisdictional defects.
43. Ibid.
44. 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96 (1963).
45. 242 S.C. 506, 131 S.E.2d 687 (1963).
46. 242 S.C. 198, 130 S.E.2d 473 (1963).
47. 243 S.C. 187, 133 S.E.2d 210 (1963).
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